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Abstract 
This paper continues a research agenda started in 2016 with an aim of more realistic 
acquisition program scheduling estimates, especially for the development (SSD) phase. We 
discuss acquisition management as a system, and its execution (especially with respect to 
schedule) from the perspective of Systems Dynamics (SD). We then present two episodes 
from F-35 program history. We then essay an integration of the SD method with these 
episodes using Cooper’s (1998) failure modes. Finally, we present a discussion of system 
performance as a potential metric for schedule estimation and analysis (through schedule 
estimating relationships.) 
Introduction 
This paper is the fourth in this series of investigations into identifying both 
alternatives to the way we do schedule estimation (process), and the schedule dynamics 
that impact weapons system development execution (effects). It builds on the research 
agenda proposed by Franck et al. in 2016 and furthered in Franck et al. in 2017 and 2018 
(Franck, Hildebrandt, & Udis, 2016, 2017, 2018). The goal of this ongoing project is to 
examine weapons systems development schedules to both identify current state and 
contributing causes of schedule estimating difficulties and suggest ways to more accurately 
predict development duration. 
Before proceeding, it is worthwhile recap the genesis of the three previous research 
efforts. The original intent, unchanged, is to pursue a research agenda aimed at producing 
more accurate schedule estimates with a focus on major defense acquisition programs. The 
original research questions included the following: 
 What is the current state of schedule estimation and control? What’s needed? 
 Where are the gaps? 
 How can operational performance metrics better capture contemporary 
operations? 
 What model(s) best capture the trade-offs among program cost and schedule, as 
well as operational capability of fielded equipment? Can those models give 
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insight into “troubled programs,” with difficulties in cost, schedule, and 
performance? 
 Analyze previous case studies (e.g., from Kennedy School of Government) for 
insights into program schedule drivers. 
 What estimating relationships best capture time to field new hardware? What 
schedule drivers are generally most important? 
 Based on available data, formulate and empirically test models with hypothesized 
schedule drivers. 
 Formulate and test prediction markets for cost and schedule problems. 
While many of these questions have been considered, we have not yet been able to 
fully answer them. This paper continues the quest to better understand the schedule 
estimation process and why, after so much research and practice, we still have not come to 
terms with accurately estimating and executing development schedules. These are some 
interim findings from the past three years: 
1. Data science, analysis, and empirical models show the type of analysis that can 
be accomplished using Selected Acquisition Reports (SAR) data. 
2. The mining and analysis of acquisition data helps to identify reasons for schedule 
delays. The reasons (Schedule Delay Factors SDF) inform planners and 
schedulers on additional activities and sources of delays that must be considered 
in schedule planning and execution. 
3. Systems Dynamics and other network models that include program schedules as 
an integral part of the modeled acquisition process have value in explaining the 
nature of schedule delays.  
4. Exploration of more sophisticated mathematical models that interpret the causal 
structure associated with program schedule achievement show promise but need 
more work. 
Why should we care about schedule delays? The primary reason is the impact on 
the warfighter. Systems scheduled to reach or provide initial operational capability that are 
delayed by years or even decades impact the DoD’s ability to fulfill its ultimate mission of 
protecting the country. Contractors care about delays because delays contribute to cash 
flow problems, and ultimately future contracts. Taxpayers care because delays not only can 
ultimately increase the cost of the development but may also result in canceled program and 
money wasted (Stumpf, 2000). 
Exploring the Concept of Schedule 
Review of the literature and discussion with defense acquisition scholars and 
practitioners interested in schedules reveals a fundamental distinction in the concept of 
weapons system development schedules. The first group focuses on the time it takes to 
develop a weapon system (Drezner & Smith, 1990; Pugh, 1987; Rothman, 1987; Tyson et 
al., 1989; Van Atta et al., 2015). This is the most prevalent research focus driven by the 
concern in the length of time necessary to field systems. This emphasis identifies schedule 
as a problem of technology maturity, cost overruns, cost estimating, budget formulation, and 
the time it takes to deliver weapons to the field. One of the aims of this aspect of schedule 
research is identify ways to reduce the time necessary to field systems. 
The second interest and the one pursued in this research agenda asks the question, 
why did it take so long? This approach, focused on the mechanics of the system 
development, explores the issues of realism in creating and executing weapons system 
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development schedules. For schedule creation, we focus on the schedule development 
process, task duration estimation, and the fundamentals of the Critical Path and Program 
Evaluation Review Technique (CPM/PERT). For schedule execution, we examine the 
reasons the established schedule is overrun. Instead, we concentrate on the challenges of 
bureaucracy, high-tech, technological complexity, and maturity and ultimately accept that 
serendipity has a role to play in the development of advanced weapons systems. Thus, we 
accept the fact that acquisition programs take longer to complete. Instead, we are interested 
in examining the details and decisions of weapon system development, and how those 
details and decisions can affect the dynamics reflected in program execution length.1  
In order to effectively examine the creation and execution of schedule, we use three 
main approaches. The first is a systems approach emphasizing the dynamics of both 
schedule creation and execution. This systems approach is based in part on the idea that 
planning, scheduling, and project execution must be examined as a system—that the project 
or program does not consist of separate and unrelated variables (Senge, 2006). The second 
approach uses the case study approach. Because of its interest and size, our current efforts 
examine the F-35. Our case study approach uses a mixed-methods analysis using data, 
interviews, and qualitative analysis of program reports. Finally, we have been examining 
schedule through a quantitative approach through earned value management. 
Systems, Complexity, and Schedules 
A critical point to be made when discussing weapons system development is that the 
act of development, that which we call a program is actually a system. A system consists of 
activities or parts that interact to produce something. A system uses inputs and operating 
through constraints and mechanisms to produce an output. An effective way to visualize a 
system is by using an IDEF model. IDEF (Integrated Computer-Aided [ICAM] DEFinition) 
was developed by the U.S. Air Force in 1973. IDEF was derived from a well-established 
modeling language, the Structured Analysis and Design Technique (SADT) (Marca & 
McGowan, 2005). IDEF is useful when exploring the activities of a system by identifying 
what functions are performed (inputs and outputs), what is needed to perform those 
functions (controls), and who or what is performing those functions (Mechanisms). Figure 1 
shows an elementary model of a weapons system development project as a system.  
Figure 1 is almost deceptive in its simplicity until one considers the volatile mix of the 
variables named. Inputs to the system include warfighter needs effectively translated into 
valid requirements. Controls or constraints include Congressional oversight and funding, as 
well as the constant challenge of shifting priorities. Acquisition and engineering personnel 
provide the mechanism for the process of development to actually occur. The output is the 
completed weapon system delivered to the warfighter. While easily diagrammed, no one 
would argue that this process is not a complex undertaking. And, while we are only 
examining a part of this system, no discussion on creating or executing weapons systems 
development schedules would be complete without considering the complexity involved. 
 
                                            
 
 
1 While the field of schedule development also includes operational research approaches to schedule 
development and estimation (e.g., Van de Vonder, Demeulemeester, & Herroelen, 2007; 
Vandevoorde & Vanhoucke, 2006), this aspect is not included in our study. 
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Figure 1. Weapon System Development as System 
Because complexity science is, well, complex, we limit this discussion of complexity 
to three recognized types, structural complexity, detail complexity, and dynamic complexity 
(Dörner, 1990; Perrow, 1999; Senge, 2006; Williams, 2002). The first type, structural 
complexity is a construct developed by Williams that effectively captures the later 
classification of detail and dynamic complexity and includes the idea of uncertainty as a 
complexity contributor. Figure 2 shows a modified structural complexity construct (Williams, 
2002). The revised graphic acknowledges the Williams’ structural complexity and 
uncertainty, but suggests that decision dynamics is a more suitable result of uncertainty. 
 
Figure 2. Complexity Model 
(Adapted from Williams, 2002) 
Detail complexity is about the size, scope, and/or the amounts of “things” in a 
system. It is concerned with the number and differentiation of the quantities of parts, dollars, 
pages in a contract, subsystems, or the size of a system, in other words, the number of 
variables (Baccarini, 1996). Detail complexity can often be overwhelming, but that is caused 
by the sheer number of elements one has to consider. Detail complexity is also the most 
familiar and thus addressable of these two forms of complexity because detail complexity 
can be captured in a spreadsheet. 
Dynamic complexity is about interdependence and interrelationships and the 
feedback loops of various events of the development (Dörner, 1990). It is dynamic 
complexity that is central to the idea of schedule. We find dynamic complexity in “situations 
where cause and effect are subtle and where the effects over time of interventions are not 
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PMs have to overcome. It is insidious in its effect because the results of dynamic complexity 
are not immediately apparent. Time is a critical factor in dynamic complexity: 
We rarely have trouble dealing with configurations in space. If we’re not 
entirely sure of what we’re looking at, we can take another look and 
resolve our uncertainty. We can normally look at forms in space again 
and again and in this way precisely determine their particular 
configuration. That is not true of configurations in time. A time 
configuration is available for examination only in retrospect. (Dörner, 
1997, p. 100) 
Managers in every industry make decisions and expect to see quick results of those 
decisions. In fact, this almost immediate feedback has become central to the U.S. stock 
market, for example. Market and industry analysts drive investors to expect to see the 
results of decisions often within the next quarter. However, dynamic systems and the 
associated complexity may or may not react in defined time frames. In reality, “Conventional 
forecasting, planning and analysis methods are not equipped to deal with dynamic 
complexity” [emphasis added] (Senge, 2006, p. 70).  
A major manifestation of dynamic complexity is the time frame. The greatest threat to 
the success of a system development is not a quick, single catastrophic act, but instead the 
slow, almost imperceptible changes in the system that result from PM decisions (Senge, 
2006). In fact, many PMs will not see the effects of their decisions before they move on to 
another position. This is the end state of decision dynamics.  
And the problem continues because we learn best from experience. This is the 
benefit of experiential learning whether it is part of a curriculum or a result of on-the-job 
training. However, we rarely directly experience the consequences of many of our most 
important decisions (Senge, 2006, p. 30). This idea of project dynamics is one the DoD 
tends to ignore, but one we will continue to explore to better understand and explain how we 
can build and execute better weapons system development schedules. 
Schedule Processes as System 
Project planning is a well-defined and generally well understood process detailed in 
both DoD and the Project Management Institute (PMI) documents. Figure 3 shows a 
modified version of the generally accepted schedule development process from activity 
definition to execution. The work breakdown structure (WBS) identifies the tasks necessary 
for system development. WBS feeds these tasks into the scheduling process by providing 
activity definitions. The activity definition part of schedule estimation focuses on those 
activities defined by the WBS. If an activity is not named in the WBS, it is not included. This 
requires consideration of those tasks/activities that may not have a direct link to engineering 
tasks but are still essential to system development. The activities include other events, such 
as those imposed by the customer, in this case the DoD.  
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Figure 3. Schedule Planning Process 
Activity sequencing is the process of sequencing the tasks identified through the 
work breakdown structure. The project planning team determines the logical sequence of 
tasks necessary to develop the system. At the same time, the planning team identifies those 
activities dependent on other activities (e.g., activities that can’t start until another is 
finished). Correct sequencing drives efficiency in execution. However, scheduling decisions 
from activity definition to execution depend on the recognition and an appreciation of 
schedule factors that are often beyond the traditional scheduling considerations. This is 
reflected in the box, Function 2.1. For example, a WBS will often identify testing as an 
activity required to be performed many times during a development as initial assemblies are 
completed through integration of those assemblies into a component or subsystem. The 
WBS will also identify contractor reviews of testing results. However, the WBS cannot 
identify management attention manifested as questions to be answered (contractor and 
government) on the testing and potential retesting (rework), as well as emphasis on reviews 
that may occur if problems are identified, wherever they occurred.  
This is where an appreciation of the project dynamics, the associated dynamic 
complexity, and ways of addressing dynamic complexity including system dynamics can be 
useful. While the normal scheduling process focuses on the actual tasks related to the 
completion of the development, system dynamics allows the addition of other, recognized 
relationships and their effects to the basic schedule. This allows the program manager to 
better anticipate potential problems.  
Schedule Dynamics 
Figure 4 is a graphical representation of the DoD “triple constraint” of cost, schedule, 
and performance. The goal on each axis is to move to the center, the cloud that depicts 
system completion. The red marks show the incremental attainment of the various targets of 
cost, schedule, and performance. The bi-directional arrows indicate the “one step forward, 
two steps back” progress often seen in system developments. For example, the contract 
point is a critical, established event, but one that is often revisited in the course of a system 
development. Cost is re-evaluated, performance is re-assessed, and schedules are redone. 
The dynamic changes occur in both directions representing the idea that the dynamics of 
the development consists of both success and failure (as measured through cost, schedule, 
and performance)—a back and forth.  
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Figure 4. The Dynamic Environment of Cost, Schedule, and Performance 
While Figure 4 emphasizes the dynamic nature of the entire project planning and 
execution process, it is at best a simplistic view of an extremely dynamic process. The 
current test of the whether the schedule was planned correctly and executed flawlessly is 
whether the cost, schedule, and performance axes are addressed and kept moving towards 
system completion. Unfortunately, in the defense world, we focus almost exclusively on cost, 
and to a lesser degree performance, while ignoring for the most part, the impact on and of 
the schedule. We have discussed this emphasis on cost and performance in previous 
papers. 
Simply stated, the planning process—focused on cost, schedule, and performance—
is itself a dynamic system. The activities on these three axes (and within the system that is 
the development project) change on their own through the dynamic processes of the 
development effort. In the execution process, the activities on these three axes are also 
changing. This movement creates time pressure forcing PMs to act, often with incomplete 
and/ or imperfect information. They can’t wait to act before making a decision as failure to 
act, also has dynamic consequences.  
We cannot content ourselves with observing and analyzing situations at 
any single moment but must instead try to determine where the whole 
system is heading over time for many people, certainly those associated 
with weapon systems development, this is an extremely difficult task. 
(Dörner, 1997) 
Consideration of the dynamic nature of the project/program management system is a 
question of the program manager’s perspective, both government and industry contractor, 
and what is being measured. Anyone that has experienced a program review knows the 
focus is on quantitative metrics. Using an Integrated Master Schedule (IMS) and other 
quantitative tools including earned value, the review focuses on how we are performing to 
schedule and cost. We measure schedule and cost efficiency using accurate and extremely 
precise measures such as the cost and schedule performance index (CPI & SPI). 
Unfortunately, this accuracy can be misleading in light of the actual dynamics that are likely 
occurring. Culturally, we tend to accept metrics and computed numbers over real life. In fact, 
we often distort our view of real life because of computed interpretations.  
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The quantitatively measured progress of system development is potentially 
overestimated because of the focus on quantitative metrics at the expense of what is 
actually happening in a development (Cooper & Mullen, 1993). Specifically, the difference 
between the actual progress in a development effort and the actual completion rates can 
and often are very different. Those with project management experience will always recall 
the development project that slowly progresses until the “last 10%,” which then takes an 
inordinate amount of time. That last 10% is most often due to rework, whether is a software 
development, hardware development, or an integration activity. 
Unfortunately, the accuracy and precision afforded by our quantitative focus become 
accepted as the “ground truth,” which leads to some of the problems we discuss in the F-35 
development (Hennessy, 1996). Basically, we have created an illusion of accuracy and 
understanding that is not real. Further, this illusion can also affect our risk assessment, 
sometimes leading to false conclusions. That is not accurate. We frequently tend to ask 
questions focused on uncertainties. And we address the uncertainties through mathematical 
models based on deterministic statistical probabilities that fail to account for the exponential 
effects of interdependencies.  
Many projects fail to deliver against their targets because conventional 
project management techniques are failing to cope with the project’s 
dynamic environment, complex interactions and the multitude of 
“soft”/people issues. (Mawby, 1999, p. 1) 
Factors Affecting Schedule 
A 1998 essay titled “Four Failures in Project Management” discusses what at the 
time were seen as some of the reasons for project management failure (Cooper, 1998). The 
essay describes the impact of a lack of systems thinking and a failure to appreciate the 
dynamics of a human-centered management process. Little has changed since 1998, and it 
is worthwhile not only to discuss the major points of that chapter, but to propose them as a 
framework to examine aspects of the F-35 development in the context of schedules. 
The four failures are as follows:  
 Failure to Know What to Expect 
 Failure to Know What to Watch 
 Failure to Know What to Do (and To Do It)  
 Failure to Know What’s What 
Failure to know what to expect is about setting project targets including schedule: 
Setting and achieving an aggressive schedule is perhaps the most sacred 
of all sacred cows in the field of project management. It is also the source 
of the most destructive behavior and phenomena in projects. (Cooper 
1998, p. 10)  
The results of knowing what to expect are overlapped work stages, schedule 
pressure, resource inefficiencies, and worked morale (Cooper, 1998, p. 11). 
Overlapped work stages occur when, in an effort to show progress, work is started 
that is scheduled later in the development in order to be able to show project progress, 
ultimately causing rework because of the out of sequence effects. Schedule pressure is just 
as it sounds: in an effort to demonstrate progress, the PM and management apply pressure 
on the workforce. The result of this pressure is a multiplication of the of out of sequence 
work and the resulting rework. Resource inefficiency occurs when the PM and management 
apply pressure, forcing overtime and other stress on the workforce.  
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Failure to know what to watch focuses on the idea of rework and the ultimate 
measure of quality. The “what to watch” aspect is about using perhaps the wrong tools to 
actually create schedules, and then not understanding what to do when rework happens. 
The basic challenge with the CPM/PERT scheduling method is that it does not account for 
what every PM knows occurs, which is rework. CPM/ PERT is a key problem because of its 
basic assumptions. The following are the basics of CPM/PERT: 
 mean of activity duration = 𝑎  4𝑚  𝑏 /6 
 standard deviation of activity duration = 𝑏 –  𝑎 /6 
where a, m and b are the minimum, modal, and maximum of the activity duration 
PERT uses four basic assumptions (Williams, 2002): 
 there is a minimum, a maximum, and a median time provided by the 
estimator 
 standard deviation is ¹ ⁄ ⁶  of the range 𝑏  𝑎  
 the distribution is 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎 
 the activity durations are independent 
The challenge with PERT is these assumptions. First, what is the max (𝑎) and 
minimum (𝑏)? What is the basis of these numbers? Second, given that 𝑎 and 𝑏 are 
estimates, how valid is the standard deviation? Third, why use a 𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑎 distribution? Finally, 
although the network diagramming side of PERT is meant to disclose interdependencies 
and relationships, activity durations are rarely independent (Williams, 2002). The reality in 
today’s complex projects is that the traditional methods of creating schedules are not robust 
enough or even complete enough for what will inevitably occur. Regardless of the causes of 
rework, the fact is it always occurs. We see it in the case of the F-35 weight problem 
discussed below, as well as any human endeavor.  
The third failure is failing to know what to do. This failure points directly at the 
decisions a PM makes and is a result of the dynamics of the system. The fact is that a PM 
can influence but is hard-pressed to actually control the execution of a complex project. On 
the industry side, the PM is captured by his or her organization and the organizational 
process, as well the matrix-driven organizational structure of most defense companies. 
Knowing what to do is about the decisions PMs make to influence the project. Because 
Cooper is focused on rework, the focus of this “failure” is concerned with the decisions about 
how to apply resources when the project gets in trouble. A perfect example of this failure is 
captured by Brook’s Law, to wit, “adding human resources to a late software project makes it 
later” (Brooks, 1995). The fact is, adding human resources to any project in progress has 
the unintended effect of slowing the overall project because the need to get the new people 
up to speed slows already slow progress, more workers end up getting in each other’s way, 
and communication among the team members becomes challenging with the increase in 
numbers (keeping everyone aware of status and changes). The final failure, “What’s What” 
relates to being able to learn. Otherwise known as lessons learned, this failure looks at an 
organization and its PMs’ ability to actually learn from previous problems.  
Complexity plus the failures provide an initial framework for analyzing existing 
development programs in general, and the F-35 in particular. Combining the ideas of 
complexity expressed as structural dynamics and decision dynamics emphasizes the issues 
of weapons system development complexity and the dynamics these forces create. The 
failures provide a means to look at development programs from a different perspective, and 
may also serve to help explain some of the challenges demonstrated in these programs. 
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Case Study: Two Episodes From the F-35 Program 
Overview 
The Joint Strike Fighter was originally intended to meet modest expectations: 
basically, a timely and affordable replacement for the F-16, F-18, and AV-8. Nonetheless it 
evolved and ended up a very tough task at the beginning of system development (SDD), as 
noted in a 2001 DoD independent cost estimate, which rated the F-35 program as high risk 
for both schedule and technical reasons (not an open source, but discussed in Blickstein et 
al., 2011, p. 37). 
In particular, the original list of requirements turned out to be a highly effective way to 
reduce engineering “trade space.” The F-35 requirements included being stealthy, 
supersonic, VSTOL capable (B model), and carrier capable (C model) (Blickstein et al., 
2011, Table 4.6, p. 49). 
The Narrow Path to Success 
To accomplish a tough set of tasks in a timely manner, F-35 program management 
started with a number of highly optimistic fundamental premises (or “framing assumptions”). 
These, in turn, led to a program strategy that was success-oriented with little margin for error 
or surprises. Major assumptions included the following:2  
JSF is readily available. Program management assumed the X-35 (a concept 
demonstrator) was a Y-35 (prototype for production, Blickstein, et al., 2011). This suggested 
that a development program (SDD) could proceed on an ambitious schedule and then 
transition quickly to full-rate production (~200 per year).  
This time it’s different. The program was structured (perhaps implicitly) on the 
promise of improved manufacturing methods and reformed acquisition practices, even 
though their value in practice had yet to be demonstrated. For example, an abbreviated test 
schedule was planned, enabled by improved computer simulation capability (unnamed 
source, 2018).3 Also, new manufacturing methods, such as unitized wing, would save both 
time in development and money in procurement. 
However, as the program progressed, system testing was generally in a catch-up 
mode as data from experimental airframes and computer simulations proved less useful 
than expected. And for example, the unitized wing was abandoned to save aircraft weight 
(discussed more below) but with a doubling of assembly time (Warwick, 2018). 
This time it’s the same. Cost estimates relied on experience gleaned from “legacy” 
aircraft, such as fourth-generation fighters, not accounting for, for example, increased 
complexity of the fifth generation. Also, the program started with a 6% weight growth 
allowance, in keeping with previous practice (Blickstein et al., 2011, p. 47). 
Initial weight estimates used methods derived from experience with previous 
generations. But as one Lockheed Martin (LM) executive noted, “Legacy estimating 
techniques just don’t work with this family of airplanes,” which are highly complex, with 
densely-packed components in the airframe (Pappalardo, 2006). 
                                            
 
 
2 Franck et al. (2012) includes one discussion (esp. pp. 80–83). 
3 For which Chatham House Rules apply. 
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The real problem was perhaps less in the assumptions themselves, and more in the 
number. Even if each assumption was reasonable, it was also reasonable to expect that not 
all would work out. And if the road to success depends on all these bets coming in, the plan 
resembles a house of cards (cascading effects from small perturbations). In the event, the 
framing assumptions didn’t all pan out, and the Joint Strike Fighter program got into trouble 
rather quickly. 
The Weight Reduction and Redesign Episode of 2004 
Because development of an operational platform was expected to be relatively quick 
and easy, initial design efforts could focus on cost (“affordability”), which included standard 
rather than custom parts. These measures added some weight. As one LM engineer put it, 
“The focus was very much on affordability at the time. People realized there was a penalty 
to be paid, and that was included in the weight estimates. It was higher than we thought” 
(Pappalardo, 2006). One likely reason for that situation is that LM’s weight estimates were 
based on previous experience, as noted above. 
The weight problems became obvious in 2003. The emerging F-35 design would be 
significantly over estimated weight, which would jeopardize meeting the program’s KPPs 
(key performance parameters). Accordingly, weight was treated as an existential threat to 
the program, especially the STOVL model. 
Weight Reduction Program Through Redesign (The Mother of All Rework 
Events)4 
The weight problem brought the program to a “screeching halt” on April 7, 2004—
with a “stand down” day. LM people were told that all work would stop until the weight 
problem was solved. This effort included substantial redesign work. LM’s main focus shifted 
from affordability to “what’s the lightest way to make it,” according to another LM engineer. 
The work was organized through a special project group called SWAT (Structural 
Weight Attack Team). SWAT was given very broad powers to waive LM’s standard design 
change guidance and to offer incentives to employees who had weight reduction ideas. 
Supply chain firms were also involved and were credited with 586 pounds at the end.  
Performance tradeoffs were likewise not off-limits. F-35B air-to-ground weapons 
carriage was reduced from two 2,000-lb bombs to 1,000 each. But a proposal to save 
structural weight through a reduction in maximum g-loads was disapproved by the DoD Joint 
Program Office (JPO). 
In late 2004, LM declared victory. The exercise implemented more than 500 weight-
loss recommendations. F-35B structural weight was reduced by 2,700 pounds; the A and C 
models 1,300 pounds each. Given the ingenuity of the engineering, some feelings of 
satisfaction were certainly warranted; according to one observer, “with SWAT, the program 
has a chance to come to fruition.” 
However, there were problems looming. One was cost. For example, “quick mate 
joints,” which added 1,000 pounds to structural weight, were abandoned. To protect 
                                            
 
 
4 The main source for this section is Pappalardo’s (2006) excellent article, “Weight Watchers.” 
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commonality, the A and C models also lost their quick-mate joints. The result was an 
increase in manufacturing costs, due to “traditional, time-consuming” methods used instead. 
Impacts known at the time were an increase in cost due to re-planning and an 18-
month slip in the schedule, estimated at $6.2 billion and 18 months, respectively. 
The Program Executive Officer at the time (PEO, Rear Admiral Steven Enewold) 
noted concerns going forward: 
 increases in manufacturing costs (probably manageable); 
 increased sustainability costs (unknown); and 
 possible loss of durability-enhancing features (“good weight”), which was a 
matter of concern throughout the test program. 
Continuing Concerns: That “Good Weight” 
In some sense, the weight reduction exercise exchanged one set of problems for 
another. Among those problems was durability (operational life), especially for the B model. 
Based on recent test data, the A and C models should last at least the planned 
operational life of 8,000 flight hours. However, estimates for expected B-model life vary 
considerably, from estimates of 2,100 (Trevithick, 2019) to 3,000 (DoD official), to well over 
8,000 flight hours (LM, quoted in Trevithick, 2019). Part of this difference is due to 
characteristics of earlier vs. later production models (a result of program concurrency).  
However, the F-35B encountered problems in durability testing that were significantly 
greater than the other models (e.g., DOT&E, 2010). At least some of this is due to the 
weight reduction exercise. For example, the 2010 DOT&E report on F-35 testing noted (p. 
16), “The difference in bulkhead material is due to actions taken several years ago to reduce 
the weight of the STOVL aircraft. However, LM has recently stated that these problems are 
now solved: “The F-35B has completed full scale durability testing to 16,000 hours. Planned 
modifications and fleet management of the early contract F-35B aircraft will ensure that they 
meet the 8,000-hour service life requirement, and aircraft delivering today incorporate these 
design changes in the build process to ensure they’ll meet 8,000 hours or more” (Trevithick, 
2019). 
However, DoD’s Director of Operational Testing & Evaluation (DOT&E, 2019) had a 
less optimistic assessment for the B model. Early production units have expected 
operational lives significantly less than 8,000 hours, perhaps as little as 2,100 hours. This 
could mean B-model retirements as soon as 2026 or expensive retrofits. Moreover, the B-
model was unable to complete its three-lifetime test profile, terminated due to numerous 
repairs on the test aircraft (p. 25). 
Other issues have emerged. For example, a safety valve removal in 2008 (40+ 
pounds weight reduction) raised issues of aircraft vulnerability to combat damage 
(Copaccio, 2013). 
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An Engine Episode5 
An interesting, and related, episode concerned the evolution of the F-119 engine 
(from the F-22) to the F-135. 
In the early 1990s’ programs, development efforts for a new strike fighter included 
with Advanced STOVL (ASTOVL) and Common Affordable Lightweight Fighter (CALF) 
programs. At this time, the strike fighter was viewed as being lightweight; one F-119 engine 
was deemed sufficient.6 The problem emerged when specifications grew with JAST, and 
affordability was pursued, accepting increases in weight. The weight problem was not 
discovered quickly because of the parametric weight estimating models discussed above 
(Pappalardo, 2006; Warwick, 2018). 
With increased requirements came an effort to increase F-119 thrust; at some point, 
the upgraded F-119 became the F-135. With the upgrade came a change in the JSF 
morphology, which necessitated a redesign, with a number of cascading effects, as reported 
in the RAND Root Cause Analysis (Blickstein et al., 2011). This RAND analysis reported and 
cascading major effects from this upgrade:  
Changes in the engine contributed to the weight growth of the JSF. Original 
plans called for the JSF to use the same engine as the F-22—the F-119 
engine. However, the F-119 proved to be underpowered for the 
performance desired of the F-35, so the F-119 engine was altered to 
generate more thrust and became the F-135 engine. By enlarging the F-
119 engine into the F-135 engine, engineering issues such as shaft length 
and efficiency had to be dealt with. However, the increase in thrust also 
lead to an increase in the engine size by a reported 1.5 inches in diameter.7 
This small change in the engine generated a need to redesign the airframe, 
which in turn changed everything from aerodynamics to stealth signature, 
all of which needed to be re-baselined. This engine issue also indicates 
lack of integration across the major contractors, which was Lockheed’s 
responsibility as the prime contractor. (Blickstein et al., 2011; emphasis 
added) 
However, the record also indicates that a need for a redesigned F-119 engine with 
increased thrust was recognized early in the program. That was a significant part of a 1997 
contract with Pratt & Whitney in 1997 (Keijsper, 2007, p. 192). PW received a 10-year 
contract to develop the F-135 (“evolved” F-119) shortly after the F-35 source selection (over 
                                            
 
 
5 This is not THE engine episode. Another—in 2014—involved an engine fire traced to engine fan 
blades rubbing against their grooves. 
6 For example, the ASTOVL program was bound to an empty weight of 24,000 pounds. (Global 
Security, CALF). The F-119 was capable of supporting STOVL operations at that weight. However, 
the empty weight of the F-35A is about 29,000 lbs, an increase of 20+%. The F-135 max thrust is 
about 43,000 lbs and increase of 20+% above the F-119. So, using this back-of-the-envelope 
comparison, development of the F-135 makes good sense. 
7 There is some ambiguity in the open literature. Standard sources state that the F-119 and F-135 
have the same diameter. However, the F-135 is longer: 220 inches vs. 203. 
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Boeing’s F-32) in October 2001 (Global Security, Pratt & Whitney F-135 Engine). The first F-
135 production unit was delivered in 2009 (Pratt & Whitney F-135, 2019).8 
Engine Development: From F-119 To F-135 
Although this paper focuses on the JSF program after Milestone B, events that 
preceded selection of the F-35 provide useful context. In May 1994, the Joint Advanced 
Strike Technology (JAST) program began. Early on the program focused on a single-engine, 
one-crewmember approach with affordability being a significant part of the rationale.  
In July, the Advanced STOVL (ASTOVL) program chose GE, PW (with Allison) to 
conduct derivative engine studies, leading to demonstrations in FY97. Major issues at the 
time included single-engine reliability (Navy concern) and thrust. 
The JAST and ASTOVL programs merged in October 1994 as JAST. In November, 
contracts were let for preliminary design of F-119 derivative. GE F-120 received less funding 
as an alternate engine. 
In December 1994, Boeing, Lockheed Martin (LM) and McDonnell Douglas (with 
BAE) received 15-month conceptual design contracts. In the spring of 1995, all three JAST 
contractor teams choose the PW F-119 as the preferred engine for their development 
aircraft (JAST, n.d.). 
In May 1996, the JAST program was renamed Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). In January 
1997, PW received a contract to develop F-119 derivatives for the Boeing and LM test 
aircraft (Keijsper, 2007, p. 193). The DoD chose a Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) 
engine approach. That is, PW would supply engines to the government, which would then 
be delivered to Boeing and LM as GFE. There were various STOVL-variant problems. But 
most ground test objectives were met by the end of 2000. 
After Milestone B 
On October 26, 2001 (shortly after source selection), Pratt and Whitney received a 
10-year contract for the design, development, fabrication, and test of the F-135 propulsion 
system and supporting equipment. It included system test and evaluation. PW was also to 
provide engines suitable for the F-35 flight testing program (“Pratt & Whitney F-135 Engine,” 
n.d.).  
PW assembled its first CTOL/CV test engine in September 2003 and conducted a 
successful test in October. The first F-135 STOVL propulsion system tests began on April 
14, 2004. 
In retrospect, however, the maturing engine and airframe designs were not 
proceeding as a coherent whole. What apparently happened was the F-135 was in 
development, with implications of the evolving new engine not yet fully known to the LM 
airframers (Blickstein et al., 2011). In retrospect, this was likely one factor in LM’s 
overreliance on parametric weight estimations (Pappalardo, 2006). If so, it also means that 
LM not only had to rework the fuselage to save weight, but also to change the fuselage itself 
to deal with the F-135 engine.  
                                            
 
 
8 The Wikipedia article references a 2009 PW press release. That link is now broken. 
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Given the RAND findings above, it appears the F-135 (relative to F-119) was not 
jointly understood by PW and LM. The RAND Root Cause Analysis offers the hypothesis 
that LM failed to carry out this part of its prime contractor responsibilities (Blickstein et al., 
2011).  
Another interesting hypothesis is that the DoD decided to deal directly with Pratt & 
Whitney for the various engine variants associated with the Boeing (X-32) and Lockheed 
Martin (X-35) development efforts. The DoD would then deliver the engines to the 
airframers. In effect, DoD was the middleman in these transactions, which is unlikely to have 
improved information flow from PW to Boeing and LM.9 That the F-135 (née F-119 variant) 
was in development at the same time as the F-35 airframe (and a DoD responsibility to boot) 
might well have been factor contributing to this outcome. 
Another factor is that the F-35 airframe and the F-135 engine designs were 
progressing concurrently. PW assembled its first test CTOL engine in September 2003, and 
its first test STOVL engine in April 2004. In that regard, it’s interesting that LM formed a 
special team (BRAT) over the 2002–2003 time period to address weight issues and brought 
F-35 development to a sudden halt, and commenced a redesign effort in April 2004, with a 
special team called SWAT (Pappalardo, 2006).10 Engine-airframe program concurrency was 
a possible factor leading to the weight reduction and redesign episode of 2004. 
Conclusion 
We have argued that the act of weapon system development is, in and of itself, a 
system. Because it is a system, it has internal interrelationships and interdependencies that 
can fundamentally change the internal processes and outputs of that system. The F-35 
activities described above are witness to that fact.  
Further, we believe the F-35 discussions above serve as examples of the “F-35 
Program System” and are thus susceptible to the complexity factors, as well as the four 
failures Cooper described. The complexity issues create an environment for the failures to 
occur. 
Using the discussion on systems, complexity, and the Four Failures, Table 1 is a 
summary of the impact the dynamics of complexity and rework can have on a weapon 
systems development. 
  
                                            
 
 
9 Given there were two proposals in plan (Boeing and LM), the GFE approach for engines was likely 
reasonable at the time. However, it did have disadvantages that appeared later. 
10 However, it doesn’t appear that the F-135 core engine weight was a problem. The F-119 “dry” 
weight is 3,900 lbs, while the F-135 weight is 3,750 lbs. Also, the F-119 and F-135 are described as 
having the same diameter (46 inches). However, the F-135 overall length (including tailpipe) is 17 
inches longer (220 vs. 203). 
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 44 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 













and accepting the 
impact of rework 
What to Do 
Understanding 
















S  S  
Cost-Reduction 
Exercise 
 D S,D D 
Estimation 
Methods 




 S,D S,D  
F-135 to F-119 
Evolution 
 D S,D  
Note. D = Decision Dynamics; S = Structural Dynamics 
Measuring Performance in A Network-Centric-Combat Environment11 
As indicated in previous reports (e.g., Franck et al., 2017, 2018), there are good 
reasons to consider the issue of performance measures in developing tools to analyze 
acquisition schedules. However, performance has become less a matter of platform 
attributes and more about what the new system adds to capabilities in an information-rich, 
networked, system-of-systems operational environment. “You look at an effect which you 
want to create with the overall force and you look at your mix of platforms and determine 
                                            
 
 
11 This section is abridged to conform with proceedings page limits. A more detailed discussion will 
appear in our final project paper. 
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which can lead the design change to achieve that effect” (John Blackburn, quoted in Laird, 
2018, p. 4). 
Also, program managers are (or should be) mindful of trade-offs being made. among 
the goals of cost, performance, and schedules (CJCS, 2015, p. A-9). With a better 
understanding of system performance in contemporary operational environments, such 
decisions could be improved.  
Finally, useful measures of system performance can be a useful in estimating 
schedules—in schedule estimating relationships among other things. 
There have been serious efforts in the past to formulate scalar performance 
measurements. However, previous efforts (e.g., Regan & Voigt, 1988) focused almost 
completely on platform characteristics and not on force characteristics. Operational 
capability is no longer a matter by adding up platform characteristics across the force, but by 
how a mix of different platform types operate together in the combat environment of the near 
future. As one observer put it, “the focus is less on what organically can be delivered by a 
new proposed new fighter than on its ability to interact with other platforms to deliver the 
desired combat effect” (Laird, 2019). 
Accordingly, this section builds on previous reports (Franck et al., 2017, 2018) with a 
more general (but still simple) model of air combat in the near future. The essential features 
of our assumed scenario are as follows: 
 two modern, high-technology air combat forces (Blue and Red); 
 widely shared (but varying) operational situational awareness;12 
 decentralized allocation of weapons to identified targets (like a “combat cloud,” 
Deptula, 2016, esp. p. 3); 
 heterogeneous forces,13 consisting of stealthy scouts (e.g., F-35), and less 
stealthy weapons carriers (e.g., F-15X); 
Winning this engagement (as in all Lanchester-based models) requires inflicting 
losses on the opposing side. Accordingly, we examine the effects on air battle results of the 
following variables: 
 Relative force sizes (R/B): even with high technology platforms and sophisticated 
networks, numbers probably still matter a great deal. 
 Stealthy aircraft (Scouts) are survivable in a high-threat environment, while 
Weapons Carriers are not (Harrigian & Marosko, 2016, pp. 2–4, 7). 
 Weapons Lethality, measured as a probability of success (kill). 
 Battle management capabilities. It’s not “super simple” and “just battle 
management” (Miller, 2016) after targets have been identified. Moreover, it 
appears that contemporary combat air arms, such as the U.S. Air Force, do 
understand these difficulties (USAF, 2016, p. 6). 
 
                                            
 
 
12 We understand that fully shared situational awareness is still a work in progress (e.g., Laird, 2019). 
13 The U.S. Air Force Air Superiority Flight Plan for 2030 specifically calls for both “stand-in” (stealthy 
fighters) and “stand-off” (weapons carriers) airborne combat forces (USAF, 2016, esp. p. 7). 
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Figure 5. Representation of a Generalized Lanchester Model of Air Combat 
Notation. XY|Z is side X (Blue or Red) units of type Y (Scout or Weapons Carrier) targeted against the opposing 
side’s units of Type Z. For example, BS|W is number of Blue Scouts assigned against Red Weapons Carriers. 
As noted above, our model involves an engagement of heterogeneous air combat 
forces: with stealthy scouts (with weapons) and non-stealthy weapons carriers. 
Within that framework, we can consider effects of numbers, weapons lethality, 
stealth, and battle management effectiveness. A battle management decision process 
assigns Blue (Red) forces to Red (Blue) targets (that are detected and tracked). The air 
combat assets (both types) then attack their assigned targets. 
By varying values for Blue (with Red characteristics held constant), what emerges is 
both interesting and suggestive. The various capabilities can be substitutes; that is, 
capability gaps in one characteristic can compensate for shortfalls in another characteristic. 
For example, Figure 6 depicts battle outcomes primarily as a function of Blue Stealth and 
Blue Lethality. To the upper right, Blue wins; at the lower left, Red wins. There are two 
curved corresponding to two levels of battle management denote a “tie.”  
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Figure 6. Representation of a Generalized Lanchester Model of Air Combat 
Notation. XY|Z is side X (Blue or Red) units of type Y (Scout or Weapons Carrier) targeted against the opposing 
side’s units of Type Z. For example, BS|W is number of Blue Scouts assigned against Red Weapons Carriers. 
Also interesting is the relative percentage change in engagement outcome with 
changes in force ratio,14 stealth, and battle management (against a Red with specified 
“baseline” capabilities). 
These are given in Table 2. 
Table 2: Responsiveness of Outcome to Changes in Force Characteristics 




11.3 6.3 1.6 6.0 
The magnitude of the numbers themselves should not be taken too seriously. The 
outcome variable is a measure of the margin of victory over the Red force (or defeat) rather 
than a raw measure of capability. In any situation of forces with about the same overall 
capability, any small change (“edge”) can have a major effect on the margin of victory. 
However, the relative values are nonetheless interesting.  
  
                                            
 
 
14 This is an “elasticity,” basically a ratio of percentage changes in outcome and force characteristic. 
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